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I. INTRODUCTION
With the U.S. rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, Canada acknowledging
that it is unlikely to meet its Kyoto commitments, and Mexico, as a
developing state, not being required to reduce its GHG emissions within
the Kyoto framework, the state of climate-change law and policy in
North America for the past decade has looked bleak. However, as the
trajectory of global climate-change governance after 2012 shifts towards
a multi-level, multi-track framework, there may be greater opportunities
for trilateral cooperation on climate change in North America. There is
increased momentum for greater cooperation in climate change arising
from the election in the U.S. of Barack Obama, who has committed to
“re-engage” with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) process.1 Mexico has signaled its willingness to
accept binding, long-term emissions-reduction targets within the UNFCCC
framework.2 The Canadian government, for its part, has indicated its
desire to negotiate a continental “cap-and-trade” agreement with the
U.S. and Mexico.3 Moreover, at the sub-national level, constituent
governments are increasingly looking to their counterparts within and
outside the state to coordinate greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation activities.4
In light of these developments, this Article surveys the current
bilateral and trilateral initiatives aimed at GHG emission reductions in
North America with a view to assessing the nature and potential role of
1. Organizing for America: BarackObama.com, Energy, http://www.barackobama.com/
issues/newenergy/index.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2009). That momentum has been
furthered by legislative action on the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
which would, inter alia, set new standards for power generation, accelerate development
of clean energy technologies, fund energy efficiency programs, and create a cap-andtrade program for U.S. greenhouse gases. See generally H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., available at
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h2454/text.
2. Mexico made this commitment, which is conditioned on financial and
technological assistance, at the Fourteenth Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties. Chris Holly, Mexico Sets Greenhouse Cut of 50 Percent By 2050—If Aid
Provided, THE ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.ccap.org/index.php?
component=news&id=158.
3. David Ljunggren, Canada Wants North America Cap-and-Trade System, REUTERS,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE4AI7012 0081119.
4. See discussion of Western Climate Initiative infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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regional climate-change law and policy within a broader global
framework. In this context, by regional cooperation, we mean cooperation
organized on a North American scale. In pursuit of this objective, this
Article seeks to identify, first, how climate-change mitigation may be
regulated usefully on a regional scale and, second, the governance
structures and institutions that may be drawn upon to create and
implement regional cooperation on climate change. Particular consideration
is also given to the capacity of regional approaches to climate-change
cooperation to meet the different climate-change objectives that Mexico
has identified, given the less developed state of its economy.
In order to frame the context of the discussion that follows, Part II
provides a brief discussion of the current development of global climatechange governance towards a more diffuse, multi-centric structure.
Proceeding from the basis that regional environmental cooperation
requires that the participating states have common policy objectives, Part
III canvasses the international commitments, stated policy objectives,
and existing policy structures addressing climate change in Canada,
Mexico, and the U.S. Because we aim to identify the broad contours of
potential cooperation in addressing climate change, the particular
commitments and policy approaches are described in summary form,
with an emphasis on identifying areas of commonality. Part IV considers
in greater detail the prospects for regional climate-change governance in
North America. Here, we seek to identify the potential forms of climatechange regulation that are likely to benefit from regional cooperation.
We also consider the potential of the principal existing regional environmental
governance structures, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, to contribute to the formation
and implementation of climate-change law and policy. Finally, Part V
considers the capacity for regional climate-change governance structures
to meet Mexican climate-change objectives. These structures include
improved GHG reporting, nationally appropriate mitigation actions,
continued economic development, access to technology, and improved
climate-adaptation capabilities. The conclusion describes a future research
agenda for North American climate-change governance.
II. CONTEXT: MULTI-LEVEL AND MULTI-TRACK
CLIMATE-CHANGE GOVERNANCE
As the first commitment period—2008 to 2012—of the Kyoto
Protocol draws to a close and states look towards the negotiation of a
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new global compact on climate change, two important characteristics of
the nature of climate-change governance are becoming apparent. First,
climate-change governance is becoming increasingly multi-level in its
architecture.5 Whereas the UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol
operate on a global scale, there are now numerous examples of climatechange governance structures that involve actors both below and above
the state, organized on multiple scales. The European Union (EU) has
chosen to implement its Kyoto Protocol obligations through regional
measures and has, in fact, made collective commitments to reduce GHG
emissions irrespective of the commitments of other states.6 The AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) is a
further, albeit looser, example of regional climate-change cooperation.7
In North America, sub-national governments have organized climatechange initiatives on a sub-regional basis, with participating governments
from both the U.S. and Canada, and a number of Mexican states are
participating as observers.8
The transnational dimension of sub-regional climate-change cooperation
is significant because it demonstrates the potential for environmental
cooperation beyond the state without the participation of national
governments or, at least, without sub-national interests being aggregated
at the national level. In the case of North American climate-change law
and policy, the lack of national leadership has led to the creation of a
policy vacuum that sub-national governments are addressing.9 The
decentralized nature of environmental governance and energy regulation
in North America has facilitated this process since sub-national
governments have significant pre-existing environmental responsibilities,
5. For theoretical discussion of multi-level governance in climate change, see
generally Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance
of Global Climate Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141 (2006) and Barry G. Rabe,
Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in Multilevel Governance Systems, 20 GOVERNANCE:
AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 423 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Council Decision 406/2009/EC, Decision on the Effort of Member
States to Reduce Their Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Meet the Community’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Commitments Up to 2020, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 137
(joint decision of European Parliament and European Council).
7. See generally Charter of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development
and Climate, Jan. 11-13, 2006, http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/resources/charter.pdf
(Canada joined the APP in Nov. 2007).
8. For a description of cooperative efforts and a full list of members and
observers, see, for example, Western Climate Initiative, Home Page, http://www.western
climateinitiative.org/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
9. BARRY G. RABE, REGIONALISM AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY:
REVISITING MULTI-STATE COLLABORATION AS AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT
TOOL 2-3 (2008), http://www.allacademic.com (change query type to “Authors” on left
side of page; then type “Barry Rabe” and click “Go;” then click on title of paper)
(presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
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many of which overlap with climate change, such as air pollution,
control over natural resources, and land-use decisions. Likewise,
jurisdictional control over matters such as land-use and transportation
planning, as well as local air quality, has given municipalities a platform
from which to pursue local climate initiatives.
The relationship between levels in multi-level governance structures is
non-exclusive in the sense that different levels of government may
address the same issues. Cooperation is also non-hierarchical, with
cooperative activities being organized both vertically, between actors at
different levels, and horizontally, between actors at the same level.
California has, for example, entertained climate-change initiatives with
both other states and other national governments.10 Similarly, New
Jersey sought to provide opportunities for Dutch companies to obtain
emissions trading credits for activities undertaken in New Jersey.11
The second emerging characteristic is the increasingly multi-track
nature of climate-change governance—that climate-change negotiations
are no longer solely focused on extending the Kyoto Protocol beyond
2012 and broadening participation in the GHG-reduction commitments
found in the Protocol.12 There appears to be an international consensus
that the UNFCCC should remain the principal basis upon which future
international negotiations should go forward.13 Thus, the objectives and
principles agreed to in the UNFCCC will provide a universal normative
basis for future negotiations. However, the top-down “targets and
timetables” approach adopted in the Kyoto Protocol is not likely to be

10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, UNITED KINGDOM AND CALIFORNIA
ANNOUNCEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN ENERGY COLLABORATION (2009),
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/fact-sheet/united-kingdom-and-california-announcement-onclimate-change-clean-energy-c/; David B. Hunter, The Future of U.S. Climate Change
Policy, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 79, 96 (Steven
Bernstein et al. eds., 2008).
11. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the U.S.: A
Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 54, 68 (2006).
12. Daniel Bodansky, Targets and Timetables: Good Policy but Bad Politics?, in
ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT 57, 59 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007).
13. The United Nations Climate Change Conference, Thirteenth Session, Bali,
Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, Held
in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14,
2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf [hereinafter
Bali Action Plan]; see Group of Eight [G8], G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders
Declaration ¶ 22 (July 8, 2008), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/20
08/doc/doc080714_en.html [hereinafter Summit Leaders Declaration].
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the exclusive approach taken. The Bali Action Plan, which sets out the
broad framework for future climate-change negotiations within the
UNFCCC, recognizes that approaches to cooperative action on mitigation
may take a number of different forms beyond economy-wide quantified
emission-limitation and reduction commitments, including sector-specific
actions as well as cooperation on technology development and transfer of
technology.14 The approach adopted by the Group of Eight (G8), which
includes all three North American governments, in the Declaration of
Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate
Change acknowledges the role of the UNFCCC as the global forum for
climate-change negotiation, but it also stresses the importance of technologydriven solutions, land-use change, and adaptation.15
A multi-track climate framework means that states may negotiate
multiple, overlapping sets of commitments in accordance with their
specific national circumstances.16 States may have preferences for different
approaches to climate-change mitigation, such as favoring carbon taxes
over emissions trading or focusing on developing technology- based
solutions.17 They may also differ in the degree to which they are willing to
adopt legally binding, international commitments, with some states
preferring soft-law commitments to hard-law commitments with strong
compliance features. In some cases, such as with the European Union
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS), states may choose
to develop collective responses that are highly integrated with the
UNFCCC and Kyoto.18 But as the APP illustrates, states may also
choose to develop a framework that is largely parallel and supplementary to
other international cooperative efforts.
The pluralist trajectory of climate-change governance provides greater
scope for regional initiatives that are oriented towards specific national

14. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 4.
15. G8, Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security
and Climate Change ¶ 1 (July 9, 2008), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit
/2008/doc/doc080709_10_en.html [hereinafter Major Economies].
16. DANIEL BODANSKY & ELLIOT DIRINGER, TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MULTITRACK CLIMATE FRAMEWORK 3 (2007), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/multitrack; see David G. Victor, Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations:
Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures in A RCHITECTURES FOR
AGREEMENT 133 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2007).
17. See generally Joseph Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global
Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373 (2003); DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES (2004),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ (follow “more” hyperlink under “Reports”; then
click on title of article).
18. Jutta Brunnée & Kelly Levin, Climate Policy Beyond Kyoto: The Perspective
of the European Union in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 58,
62-63 (Steven Bernstein et al. eds., 2008).
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and regional conditions. Bodansky and Diringer note that increased
flexibility is the primary advantage of a multi-track framework since
states are more likely to participate in cooperative actions that are well
suited to their domestic economic and political requirements.19 Where
those requirements are regional in scope because of common
geographical features, closer economic integration, or shared political
institutions, there may be advantages to regionally based arrangements.
When one considers the multi-level aspect of climate-change governance,
flexibility also provides improved opportunities for actors, such as subnational governments and non-state actors, who are not formally
recognized in international law, to respond to global climate change in
accordance with their preferences, without necessarily having those
preferences aggregated and possibly subsumed by national governments.20
The potential costs of increased flexibility are a loss of broader policy
coherence and a lack of reciprocity between states. The latter concern is
particularly important given the strong incentives for free-riding
associated with climate-change mitigation. As a consequence, continued
coordination of the various tracks in a multi-track framework is
necessary. The ability to accurately track emissions and require disclosure
of emissions data is a baseline requirement for continued cooperation,
particularly because reliable comparison of emissions-reduction
information enhances the opportunity for linking different tracks.21
Comparability provides states with assurances that their own sacrifices
are being reciprocated by other states and a basis for assessing the fairness
of climate-change burden allocation globally. Some U.S. climate bills
have proposed trade restrictions on goods coming from countries that do
not have “comparable” climate-change regulations.22 The ability to

19. BODANSKY & DIRINGER, supra note 16, at 3-5.
20. Consider, for example, the differences in policy between the Provinces of
Alberta and Québec. Alberta, with a heavy economic reliance on emissions-intensive
industries, such as oil and gas, does not seek to implement emission reductions in the
short term; Québec, on the other hand, generates and exports hydro-electric, and is more
willing to adopt more stringent emissions-reduction targets. See COUNCIL OF THE
FEDERATION, CLIMATE CHANGE: LEADING PRACTICES BY PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL
GOVERNMENTS IN CANADA 3-6 (2007), available at http://www.councilofthefederation.
ca/pdfs/CCInventoryAug3_EN.pdf.
21. For example, there may be benefits to allowing emissions trading across different
governance structures. For a discussion of attempts by New Jersey to participate in the
EU-ETS, see, for example, Engel, supra note 11, at 68.
22. See, e.g., Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, 110th Cong. § 502(f)
(2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.1766.
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compare regulatory programs and to demonstrate similar levels of
burdens on trade-competitive sectors may be necessary to avoid these
kinds of protectionist measures in climate legislation. Since cooperative
arrangements may be developed on multiple levels, coordination
requires both vertical integration between levels and horizontal
integration between various tracks. The complexity of integration suggests
that states should approach the negotiation of multiple climate-change
arrangements with considerable caution, as the transaction costs and the
costs of increased fragmentation may outweigh the benefits of flexibility.
Increased governance arrangements are not an unalloyed good.
III. THE EXISTING GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE: CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMITMENTS AND POLICIES
A. North American GHG Emissions
To understand the existing governance landscape, it is first helpful to
take stock of the basic GHG-emissions conditions in North America.
Looking at the statistics in Figure 1 (see below at page 207), the principal
condition that must be accounted for is the asymmetry in emissions
between the three North American countries. On an absolute basis, U.S.
emissions are much greater than both Canada and Mexico, owing to its
larger economy; on a per capita basis, Mexico’s emissions are significantly
less—one-fourth—than those of Canada and the U.S. This asymmetry
will likely impact the architecture of any regional climate structure. For
example, regional cooperation will need to account for Mexico’s lower percapita emissions and its higher emissions-growth rate, possibly through the
application of differential-reduction requirements. Relative to absolute
emissions, it might be expected that market-based structures, such as
trading systems, will reflect the fact that U.S. emissions will account for
the majority of the market. Since the U.S. gains relatively less in terms
of access to a larger market, it may have less incentive to adjust its
domestic programs to meet regional requirements.23 The GHG intensity
numbers in the bottom of Table 1, which indicate the amount of GHGs
emitted per economic output (GDP), show that Mexico, and to a lesser
extent, Canada, release more emissions to produce the same amount of

23. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INTL. L. 1,
58-61 (2002) (noting that regulatory convergence will often result in adoption of the
standards of more powerful states).
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TABLE 1 BASIC GHG STATISTICS FOR NORTH AMERICA
GHG Emissions in 2006 (MtCO2e)
(excluding Land Use, Land-Use Change,
and Forestry [LULUCF])24
GHG Emissions in 2006 (MtCO2e)
(including LULUCF)

Canada

U.S.

Mexico

718

7006

553 (in 2002)

760

6001

643

GHG Emissions in 1990 (MtCO2e)
(excluding LULUCF)25

592

6084

425

Change in emissions from 1990-2006
(excluding LULUCF)

21%

15%

30% (in 2002)

2.1%

22%

1.5%

22.1

24.5

5.2

652

464

701 (in 2002)

Contribution to Global GHG Emissions in
2004 (excluding Land-Use Change and
Forestry)26
GHG emissions per capita in 2000 (tCO2e)
(excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry)27
Emissions Intensity in 2006 (tCO2e/millions of
dollars (GDP-PPP)) (including LULUCF)28

24. UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do
(to obtain data select “Canada,” “United States” and “Mexico” under “Select Party;” select
“All years” under “Select Years;” select “Total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF/ LUCF”
under “Select Category” and select “Aggregate GHGs” under “Select Gas”) (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009).
25. UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do
(to obtain data select “Canada,” “United States” and “Mexico” under “Select Party;” select
“All years” under “Select Years;” select “Total GHG emissions including LULUCF/LUCF”
under “Select Category” and select “Aggregate GHGs” under “Select Gas”) (last visited Oct.
28, 2009).
26. World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool [CAIT], http://cait.
wri.org/ (register and log into CAIT; then click “CAIT” under “Access CAIT Products;”
then follow hyperlink to “Yearly Emissions”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
27. KEVIN BAUMERT ET AL., NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 22 (2005), available at http://www.wri.org/
publication/navigating-the-numbers (follow “full report” hyperlink).
28. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Sept.
2006), http://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/WEO/2006/02/DATA/INDEX.ASPX
(last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (source of GDP figures). The emissions intensity numbers
were calculated using 2006 (Canada and U.S.) and 2002 (Mexico) GHG emissions, including
LULUCF.
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economic output as the U.S. This suggests that there may be potential
for increased emissions efficiency in both Canada and Mexico.
Broken down by sector (see Figure 2 below at page 207), the GHG
inventories for Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. look fairly similar, with
the exception of higher emissions from land use, land-use change, and
forestry in Canada and Mexico, and higher emissions from waste in
Mexico. The GHG emissions by gas type reflect similar emissions patterns.
Given the broad range of activities that occur within each of these sectors, a
more exacting analysis is required to assess potential for sectoral
programs in North America. Further study should identify, inter alia,
those sectors that make significant GHG contributions within each state,
sectors that have sharp emission rate increases, and those sectors where
GHG intensity levels differ between countries, suggesting opportunities
for improvement with existing technology.29
One area where there is a higher degree of difference among Canada,
Mexico, and the U.S. is vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
The differences in vulnerability are affected by both geographic and
economic factors.30 Quantifying vulnerability to climate change remains
difficult, but one global study indicated that Canada was the least vulnerable
of the states and showed that Mexico has markedly higher vulnerability.31
Another study focusing on Mexican vulnerability indicated that infrastructure,
human capital, and economic factors were strong determinants of
vulnerability.32 The differences in vulnerability have implications for
the relative priorities of mitigation and adaptation, with Mexico needing to
direct greater resources to improving its resilience towards climate
change than Canada and the U.S. Such differences do not undermine
regional cooperation but are likely to influence its form. For example,
Mexico is more likely to want to include technical assistance and
financing for adaptation measures as part of a broader regional climate
cooperation initiative.33
29. See Daniel Bodansky, International Sectoral Agreements in a Post-2012 Climate
Framework 9-10 (May 2007) (unpublished working paper), http://www.pewclimate.org/
working-papers/sectoral (follow hyperlink “download entire report”). Bodansky also
suggests economic and political—”negotiability and participation”—factors. Id. at 10-11.
30. María Eugenia Ibarrarán Viniegra & Salimah Mónica Cossens González, Climate
Change Research and Policy in Mexico: Implications for North American Security,
35 POL. & POL’Y 684, 684 (2007); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC],
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 26
(2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
31. New Report Assesses Countries’ Climate Change Vulnerability, CSR EUR., Aug.
12, 2008, http://www.csreurope.org/news.php?type=&action=show_news&news_id=1598.
32. Viniegra & González, supra note 30, at 691.
33. Mexico’s greater need for adaptation is reflected in their domestic policies
discussed infra Part 2(c).
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B. International Commitments and Programs
Appendix 1 sets out in comparative form a summary of Canada’s,
Mexico’s, and the U.S.’s respective international commitments and
participation in international programs relating to climate change. In
Appendix 2, we have prepared another chart comparing each national
government’s domestic climate change policies. In what follows, we
draw out the key areas of commonality and difference in climate-change
policy among these states.
The starting point for each state is common participation in the
UNFCCC regime. As a framework treaty, the UNFCCC does not impose
quantified obligations on the parties; rather, it commits the parties to
additional cooperative activities in furtherance of the overall objective of
stabilizing atmospheric GHGs at non-dangerous levels.34 Despite the
disengagement by the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC has
been repeatedly affirmed by Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. as the
appropriate forum for continued global negotiation on climate change.35
The U.S. has, for example, continued in its financial support for the
regime itself, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
and through contributions to the Global Environmental Facility.36 The
current significance of the UNFCCC is the continued acceptance of the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” that underlies
the basic architecture of the UNFCCC.37 In the North American context,
Canada and the U.S. are identified as Annex I states with primary
responsibility for addressing climate change.38 Mexico, as a non-Annex
I party, is obligated to undertake mitigation measures taking into account
its development goals and national circumstances and to cooperate in
addressing global climate-change impacts and causes.39
The need for integration of regional initiatives within a global
framework will require consistency between the UNFCCC and any
regional framework. The “broad but shallow” architecture of the UNFCCC
34. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
35. Major Economies, supra note 15, ¶ 1; Summit Leaders Declaration, supra note
13, ¶¶ 22-23; Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 3.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENERGY SECURITY, CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE 34 (2008).
37. UNFCCC, supra note 34, at art. 3(1).
38. Also, Annex I states hold further responsibilities to assist developing states
with adaptation measures. Id.
39. Id. arts. 4(1)(b)-(c).
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does not impose significant constraints, and the language of the treaty
acknowledges in several provisions the possible role of regional
cooperation.40 The acceptance by all three North American states of a
common methodology for calculating national GHG inventories and
reporting those to the UNFCCC will facilitate integration. The IPCC
process also provides a common scientific basis for the development of
regional policies. The IPCC’s work on climate vulnerability has, for
example, been undertaken on a regional basis and may provide an
agreed-upon starting point for regional approaches to adaptation.
The asymmetrical architecture of the UNFCCC was carried over into
the Kyoto Protocol, with Canada and the U.S. agreeing to economy-wide
GHG emission reductions of 6% and 7%, respectively, but not requiring
reciprocal cuts from developing countries. The U.S. did not ratify the
Protocol. Although Canada is a party to the Protocol (as is Mexico as a
non-Annex B party), it has acknowledged that it will not meet its Kyoto
obligations. It is increasingly clear that Canada is moving away from the
Kyoto “targets and timetables” model. Canada’s most recent domestic
policy approach emphasizes emissions intensity, as opposed to absolute
reductions, and defines its emissions-reduction goals in terms of a 2006
baseline, as opposed to a 1990 baseline. Given the current stance of
Canada and the evolving U.S. position, it is unclear whether Canada and
the U.S. will agree to short- to mid-term economy-wide emissions
reductions. To date, the three North American states have placed greater
emphasis on long-term targets. For example, the Bali Action Plan,
adopted at the 13th Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties,
simply calls for the adoption of a “long-term global goal for emissions
reduction.”41 A similar emphasis on long-term goals was made in the
Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security
and Climate Change, in which Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.
participated.42 At the 14th Meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties, Mexico pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by 50% by 2050
from a 2002 baseline.43 U.S. President Barack Obama has similarly
indicated his administration’s intention to see the U.S. reduce its
emissions by 80% from its 1990 levels by 2050.44 This target has been
affirmed by the House of Representatives in the American Clean Energy

40. Id. arts. 4(1)(b), 6(a), 11(5).
41. Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 3.
42. Major Economies, supra note 15, ¶ 2.
43. Holly, supra note 2.
44. Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Promoting A Healthy Environment, http://www.
barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
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FIGURE 1

GHG Emissions by Sector (% of total emissions)
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FIGURE 2
GHG Emissions By Gas
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and Security Act of 2009. 45 Canada, for its part, has indicated its
intention to reduce its emissions by 60-70% by 2050, using a 2006
baseline.46
Both Canada and Mexico have participated in the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol; although, to date, no
CDM projects have been concluded between Canada and Mexico.47
Canada has not used the joint-implementation or emissions-trading
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Canada’s current domestic
climate-change policy allows for the use of credits generated from CDM
projects by private firms to satisfy those firms’ domestic emission
reduction obligation. However, Canada’s continued participation in the
CDM process is far from certain. Regardless of the precise scheme,
through their current participation, Canada and Mexico have developed
capacity to design and implement creditable projects. Demonstrable
governance capacity in relation to marketable emissions credits is
particularly desirable, as it ensures that credits are not granted for
unrealized or temporary emissions reductions. The potential for multiple
emission-credit markets and the possibility of credits being “doublecounted” again underscores the importance of integrating parallel policy
frameworks.48
From a regional perspective, the move away from short-term,
economy-wide targets at the global level will create policy space for
bottom-up approaches that focus more on creating the conditions for
reducing emissions than the top-down approach.49 The most prominent
existing example of a much looser form of international climate-change
cooperation is the APP, which includes the U.S. and Canada, as well as
major Pacific Rim economies.50 The APP is not a formally binding
treaty but, rather, provides a framework for exchanging information and
other cooperative activity between states with a primary focus on energy

45. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
§ 311 (2009).
46. Turning the Corner: Taking Action to Fight Climate Change (Mar. 2008), http://
www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/brochure_eng.html.
47. See infra Appendix 1.
48. For a discussion of some of the accounting complexities and problems with the
CDM, see generally Michael Wara & David Victor, A Realistic Policy on International
Carbon Offsets (Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working
Paper No. 74, 2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_ final.pdf.
49. The distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches is discussed
in BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 17, at 9-10.
50. Charter of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate,
supra note 7. APP members include: Australia, China, Canada, India, Japan, South
Korea, and the U.S. Id.
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cooperation. 51 The APP’s voluntary approach allows for broad
participation of countries that have traditionally resisted binding
emissions reductions.52 The cost of securing participation is that
environmental effectiveness of the APP is likely to be much lower than
an approach that articulates emissions-reduction commitments.53 The
APP has no quantified environmental outcomes and no price-driven
incentives for technological innovation. The structure of the APP is
similarly diffuse, consisting principally of eight sectoral task forces,54
which include both public and private representation. The agenda for
each task force is defined broadly, leaving considerable room for task
force members to define their respective work plans. To date, the
outcomes have been non-regulatory, focusing instead on developing
industry best environmental practices and moving towards reducing
barriers to trade for environmental goods and services.55
In addition to the APP, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. participate in a
variety of climate-oriented networks.56 Many of these have focused on
the development and implementation of new technologies, particularly
in the energy sector. None of these organizations is intended to develop
binding rules; although, like the APP, some have produced guidelines
and seek to identify best practices. These groups often constitute both
public and private sector representatives, as well as civil society
organizations. Participation in climate-oriented networks includes both
developed and developing states, but there are few formal avenues for
technology transfer or direct-project financing in developing states.

51. The APP is best understood as a form of trans-governmental networked
governance. For a discussion of trans-governmental networks, see generally Anne-Marie
Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. OF
L. & SOC. SCI. 211 (2006).
52. Only Japan and Canada have emissions-reduction obligations under Kyoto.
53. The relationship between participation and strictness of rules is considered in
George Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News and
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996).
54. The sectoral task forces include: Aluminum, Buildings and Appliances, Cement,
Cleaner Fossil Energy, Coal Mining, Power Generation and Transmission, Renewable
Energy & Distributed Generation, and Steel. APP Public-Private Sector Task Forces,
http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/task_forces.aspx (last visited Oct. 28,
2009).
55. For example, appliance-testing harmonization, enhancing production processes,
developing sector-related benchmark and performance assessments, identifying
current reclamation activities in partner countries, and enhancing synergy among task
force objectives. See id.
56. See infra Appendix 1 for list and description.
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While all of these initiatives address aspects of the climate-change issue,
there is very little evidence that states are concerned with integrating
these various initiatives. Indeed, the informal and decentralized structure
of this form of governance makes integration more difficult.
In North America, the structure of regional cooperative efforts is
similarly diffuse. The most institutionalized set of commitments
regarding the environment is found in the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the so-called NAFTA
environmental side agreement.57 The NAAEC creates the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which is governed
by a Council consisting of the environment minister from each state.58 It
also has a permanent secretariat and opportunities for civic engagement.59
Despite having a broad mandate to improve environmental quality,60 the
Council has only been engaged in climate-change policy in limited
ways.61 In 1995, the Council adopted a Statement of Intent to Cooperate
on Climate Change and Joint Implementation, which set out a number of
areas of cooperation for the states to pursue, including joint pursuit of
GHG-mitigation technologies, conservation and enhancement of carbon
sinks, improving GHG-emission inventory-and-forecasting methodologies,
and climate-change research. 62 Significantly, the Statement of Intent
specifically references the UNFCCC, including the common but
differentiated responsibilities of the parties and the reference to “joint
implementation.”63 The Statement of Intent appears only to have resulted in
a small number of joint projects.64 There has been no specific mention of
climate change in the Council Ministerial Statements or Communiqués
since an indication in 1998 that the Parties would work together under
the framework of the Kyoto Protocol to develop North American
opportunities for the CDM, which did not happen. More recent
57. See generally North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., done Sept. 9-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
58. Id. at arts. 8-9.
59. The structure of the CEC includes the Joint Public Advisory Committee, Id. at
art. 16, and allows for citizen-initiated reviews of enforcement failures.
60. See generally NAAEC, supra note 57.
61. See generally Michele Betsill, Regional Governance of Global Climate Change:
The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL. 2 (2007). Among the types of involvement are publication of educational materials
on climate change and awarding of modest grants to projects aimed at emissions
reductions.
62. Commission for Environmental Cooperation [CEC], Statement of Intent to
Cooperate on Climate Change and Joint Implementation, at § III, Council Res. No. 95-6
(Oct. 13, 1995), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=149&
varlan=english.
63. See generally id.
64. Early projects supported by the CEC under this mandate included reforestation
and renewable-energy initiatives in Mexico, in partnership with the U.S. private sector.
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communiqués focus on air pollution, renewable energy, green building,
and chemical pollutants; while these issues bear on climate change, they
do not directly implement climate-change policy.65
Michelle Betsill concludes that the “potential benefits of situating a
North America climate governance system in the CEC are limited.”66 In
essence, Betsill argues that the linkages between climate change and
environmental issues in which the CEC has traditionally been involved,
such as air quality, are unlikely to result in a robust climate-change
regime. Institutionally, the CEC has been hampered by its intergovernmental
structure, which requires consensus among the three participants
to move any issue forward. 67 The CEC’s inactivity on climate
change reflects the lack of willingness of the Parties to engage one
another on climate-change issues. This situation may improve given the
greater recognition by the Parties that aggressive GHG mitigation is
required. The other potential handicap that the CEC labors under is that
its governance structure feeds solely into environment ministries, but
solutions will require involvement from other ministries, particularly in
the energy and natural resources area.
The other potential vehicle for regional climate-change cooperation is
the North American Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP).68 The
SPP is a form of trans-governmental networked governance.69 The SPP
has no foundational treaty, nor does it have any permanent institutions.
Instead, the SPP is an agenda of bilateral and trilateral regulatory initiatives
aimed at promoting regional security and regional prosperity.70 The
work program is undertaken by a series of working groups established
under the SPP, including an environmental working group and an energy
65. For example, Council Resolution No. 01-05 addresses the development of
common methodologies for emissions inventories and forecasts with passing reference to
the UNFCCC. CEC, Promoting Comparability of Air Emissions Inventories, at Nos. 1,
4, Council Res. No. 01-05 (June 29, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_
docs/documents/index.cfm?ID=522&varlan=english.
66. Betsill, supra note 61, at 21.
67. NAAEC, supra note 57, at art. 9(6).
68. As of August 2009, the SPP is no longer an active initiative. See http://www.
spp.org.
69. Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially)
Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America, 8 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 479, 492 (2008).
70. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America [SPP], Prosperity Agenda,
http://www.spp.gov/prosperity_agenda/index.asp?dName=prosperity_agenda (last visited
Oct. 28, 2009); SPP, Security Agenda, http://www.spp.gov/security_agenda/index.asp?
dName=security_agenda (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
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working group. The working groups, consistent with the SPP’s transgovernmental form, are made up of government officials. Climatechange law and policy in the SPP has been noticeable only in its absence.71
Some of the agenda items focus on clean-energy and energy-efficiency
measures,72 but there has been no overall intention to use the SPP to
address climate change in a comprehensive manner. However, after the
most recent Leaders Meeting, the joint statement included the following
reference to climate change:
We reiterate our support for the Bali Action Plan and stress the urgency of
reaching agreement to ensure the full, effective and sustained implementation of
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change now, up to and beyond
2012. We believe that the Major Economies Leaders Meeting should make a
contribution to that outcome. All should redouble efforts to address climate change
and to establish nationally appropriate programs and goals to be reflected in binding
international commitments based on the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, to contribute to ensuring global greenhouse
gas emission reductions, adaptation measures, energy security, and sustainable
development. We are determined to work together to further explore regional
cooperation in climate change efforts, including, but not limited to, advancing
innovative and suitable clean energy technologies, building the capacity to adopt
and deploy them and developing appropriate financial and technical instruments. We
reaffirm our shared conviction that increased trade in environmental goods,
services, and technologies can have a positive impact on global climate change
efforts and encourage the removal of barriers to such trade.73

This statement is of note for several reasons. First, it reiterates the
commitment of the leaders to address climate change through
international negotiation in accordance with the underlying principles of
the UNFCCC, including the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. Second, it acknowledges the potential for regional
cooperation to address climate change. Third, it indicates that such
cooperative efforts may focus on promoting technological innovation
and capacity-building. Finally, the Joint Statement also includes a
reference to “energy security,” a matter of increasing domestic

71. For example, an influential background report prepared by the Council on
Foreign Relations does discuss climate change as part of a broader North American
resource strategy. See J OHN P. M ANLEY ET AL ., B UILDING A N ORTH A MERICAN
COMMUNITY 15-18 (2005), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8102/building_a_
north_american_community.html.
72. See SPP, The Energy Working Group, http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spppsp.nsf/eng/00045.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009); see also Agreement Among the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the
Government of the U.S. of America for the Cooperation in Energy Science and
Technology, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 3, July 23, 2007, http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spppsp.nsf/vwapj/energy.pdf/$file/energy.pdf.
73. Prime Minister of Canada, Joint Statement by President Bush, President Calderon,
Prime Minister Harper—North American Leaders’ Summit (Apr. 22, 2008), http://pm.gc.ca/
eng/media.asp?category=3&id=2074.
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importance in the U.S. The deliberate inclusion of energy security (and
the specific reference to the Major Economies Leaders Meeting), within
a statement on climate policy, ties the regional process to the broader
issue of energy security and to the approach adopted at the Major
Economies Leaders Meeting.74 This approach is also consistent with
that advocated by an independent task force on North American
integration, which ties climate change to a regional resource strategy.75
Finally, the U.S. and Mexico have developed a number of bilateral
climate-change projects under the auspices of the USAID Global
Climate Change Program. The funding is largely project based and has
focused on land-use improvements and clean-energy production.76
Canada and Mexico also signed a Joint Statement on Climate Change
Cooperation at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Montreal on December 8, 2005.77 In February 2009, Canada and the
U.S. agreed to a “Clean Energy Dialogue,” which promotes cooperation
in the research and development of clean-energy technologies.78
C. Domestic Policies79
Appendix II summarizes the prevailing domestic policies of the
federal governments in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. In each of these
countries, sub-national governments have important constitutional
controls over the environment and natural resources. Consequently, subnational governments are increasingly becoming an important source of
domestic climate change policy. The respective roles of federal and subnational governments continue to evolve, but there is increasing evidence
74. Cf. Bodansky, supra note 12, at 64.
75. JOHN P. MANLEY ET AL., supra note 71, at 18 (“A North American energy and
emissions regime could offer a regional alternative to Kyoto that includes all three
countries.”).
76. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. [USAID], USAID’S GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate/docs/
brochures/gcc.pdf.
77. News Release, Env’t Can., Can.-Mex. Sign Joint Agreement on Climate Change
Cooperation During the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Can. (Dec. 8,
2005), available at. http://www.ec.gc.ca/media_archive/press/2005/051208-4_n_e.htm.
78. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama and
Prime Minister Harper Vow Joint Effort on N. Am. Econ. Recovery (Feb. 19, 2009),
available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2433.
79. The discussion of Canadian domestic policy in this section draws from Neil
Craik, Segnali contraddittori: evoluzione della politica climatica canadese, 3-4 RIVISTA
GIURIDICA DELL’AMBIENTE 695 (2008) (Italy).
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that sub-national governments are not willing to leave transnational
cooperation in the hands of their respective federal governments and are
entering into trans-boundary cooperative arrangements with one another.
As Table 1 indicates, neither Canada nor the U.S. has come close to
achieving its Kyoto commitments. Indeed, emissions have risen steadily
since the 1990 baseline. A less ambitious approach is currently taken in
the domestic climate change policies of both states. For its part, Canada
has indicated a GHG emission reduction target of 20% from its 2006
emission levels by the year 2020. This amounts to projected emissions
of 600 Mt in 2020—an amount that is still higher than Canada’s 1990
emission levels. In the longer term, Canada has indicated a willingness
to reduce its GHG emissions by 60% to 70% by 2050 based on a 2006
baseline.80 The only quantified emission target the U.S. government has
officially adopted is an 18% reduction in GHG intensity levels from
2002 levels by 2012. However, the Obama administration has indicated
a commitment returning to 1990 levels by 2020, in addition to its 80%
reduction by 2050.81 Mexico has not adopted legislated reduction targets
as such, but it has indicated that it has the potential to reduce its
emissions by more than 140 Mt by 2014.82 As noted, Mexico has also
indicated its willingness to reduce its emission by 50% by 2050, but
Mexico is careful to qualify its pledge by indicating that its success in
achieving these reductions is conditional upon receiving financial and
technical assistance.83
The emission-reduction targets announced are not strongly sciencedriven in the sense that they were arrived at by first determining the
reductions that need to be achieved to stabilize GHGs at safe levels.
There is growing scientific consensus that in order to keep global
temperature rises from exceeding 2ºC from pre-industrialization levels,
atmospheric levels of GHGs need to be limited to between 450 and 550
ppm CO2e, which in turn would require global emission reductions of
50% of 1990 levels by 2050.84 The EU has taken note of the scientific
80. This is equivalent to a 40%-52% reduction from 1990 baseline levels.
81. This target is affirmed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
S. 311, supra note 1.
82. The calculation of a 140 Mt emissions reduction was determined by adding the
estimated emissions reduction, as determined by the Mexican government, for
each policy goal included in Mexico. See INTERSECRETARIAL COMM’N ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, NATIONAL STRATEGY ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 7
(2007) [hereinafter MEXICO NSCC].
83. Holly, supra note 2.
84. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius: The Way Ahead for 2020 and
Beyond, at 3, COM (2007) 2 final (Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Communication from the
Commission]; see IPCC, supra note 30, at 68.

214

CRAIK-DIMENTO[1] (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 1: 195, 2009]

2/5/2016 12:39 PM

Climate Law and Policy in North America
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

evidence and has specifically linked its reduction targets to achieving the
long-term goal of GHG stabilization, with specific reference to limiting
climate change to a 2ºC rise.85 Mexico is the only North American state
that appears ready to accept a quantified long-term goal “of an indicative
non-binding nature” expressed in terms of GHG concentration levels at
550 ppm CO2e.86
The clearest example of the priority given to economic growth in
North American climate policy is the use of intensity-based targets by
both Canada and the U.S. The Canadian policy has identified sixteen
sectors that must reduce their emissions intensity by 18% (from a 2006
baseline) by 2010 and by 2% per year thereafter until 2020, at which
time the government has indicated its willingness to move to fixed
emission limits.87 The difficulty is that predictions about absolute future
emission levels are dependent upon productivity levels, and absolute
levels may still increase if there is strong growth.
Reductions in carbon intensity will be attractive in sectors where
intensity levels are high and there exist technological solutions for
reducing GHG emissions—for example, where old stock needs to be
replaced. However, in order to make significant emission cuts,
considerable investment will need to be made in research and
development of new technologies, particularly in the energy sector.88
The Canadian reduction targets are based heavily on the development of
carbon-capture and storage technology (CCS), which is highly
compatible with fossil fuel extraction and production, key sectors in the
Canadian economy. CCS allows for the continuing use of coal-fired
electrical-generating plants, a predominant form of electrical production
in the U.S. In order to provide the needed funding for technological
innovation, the Canadian policy foresees the creation of a technology
fund in which firms with reduction requirements can make contributions
in exchange for credits. The contribution amount starts out very high,

85. Communication from the Commission, supra note 84.
86. MEXICO NSCC, supra note 82, at 14. However, the Obama/Biden campaign
materials indicate support for measures to reduce carbon “by the amount scientists say is
necessary . . . .” Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America, http://www.
barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
87. MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR INDUSTRIAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, at iii (2008), available at
http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/pdf/COM-541_Framework.pdf.
88. Scott Barrett, A Proposal for a New Climate Change Treaty System, in A
GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA, supra note 10, at 315.
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allowing for firms to meet 70% of their target through contribution
credits in 2010, but falls rapidly to 0% by 2018.89 The contribution rate
has been set at $15/tonne CO2e and will rise with growth in GDP but
does not appear to be tied to the market price of carbon emission credit
units. The framework also contemplates the generation of credits
through offsets, early action, and the use of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). The credits generated will be available for domestic
inter-firm trading.90
Prior to the Obama administration, the U.S. federal climate change
policies similarly relied on the development and deployment of new
technologies, yet funding for research and development had not been
tied to emissions, nor were there opportunities for firms to receive
credits for research and development activities. Instead, the U.S. relied
on voluntary programs of emission reduction and tax incentives to
promote innovation.91 The reliance on voluntary measures inhibits the
development of a carbon market since the price of carbon-emission
credit-reduction units will be affected by the demand for reduction
created by binding obligations. President Obama has indicated that his
administration will implement a national cap-and-trade program.92 The
structure of such a scheme has been laid out in several bills before
Congress, most notably in the American Clean Energy and Security
Act.93 There is a private carbon exchange in Chicago that relies on
voluntary but legally enforceable emission reduction commitments.94
There is also a carbon exchange operating in Montreal that will trade
credits generated under the Canadian regulatory framework.95 Mexico
has indicated a desire to develop price signals for carbon use through the
gradual development of an emission trading system.96
A fair amount of overlap exists among all three countries in the areas
identified for emission reductions. All three countries place some
emphasis on the further development of renewable energy supplies and
the increased use of combined heat and power plants. All three

89. There are, however, opportunities for more generous credit allowances—up to
100% of a firm’s reduction obligation to 2018—for “pre-certified” investments in CCS.
90. See MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 87.
91. Hunter, supra note 10, at 89-90.
92. Organizing for America: New Energy For America, http://my.barackobama.
com/page/content/newenergy_more#emissions (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
93. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11th Cong.
§ 311 (2009).
94. Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Nov. 1,
2009).
95. Montreal Climate Exchange, Canadian Carbon Market, http://www.mcex.ca/
aboutGhg_canCarbonMarket_en (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
96. Holly, supra note 2.
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countries also address improving energy efficiency and fuel efficiency
for vehicles, but, again, the approach is to promote improvements
largely through voluntary policies, not regulation. The Mexican plan
emphasizes land-use issues, which receive little attention in Canadian
and U.S. policies. Similarly, adaptation is largely ignored in Canada and
the U.S., but forms an important part of the Mexican policy strategy.
In the U.S., the absence of a strong federal strategy to address climate
change has led to sub-national activity, where there has been a greater
willingness to accept binding GHG emission reductions. Further
programs, such as renewable portfolio standards, state based mandatory
fuel efficiency requirements, and intra-state emission trading programs,
have accompanied these reduction commitments.97 In Canada, every
province has climate change policies, all of which include specific
GHG-reduction targets, most of which are more ambitious than those
announced by the federal government.98 However, Canadian provinces
are only now moving to implement their GHG policies into law and have
less well-developed mechanisms than those of their sub-national
counterparts in the U.S.99 There remain significant differences between
sub-national jurisdictions in North America, with oil- and gas-producing
jurisdictions, such as Alberta, being viewed as policy laggards, compared to
leaders such as California, New York, and British Columbia. Many
North American cities also have GHG-emission-reduction targets and
accompanying programs.100 Municipal level networks not only provide
opportunities for cities to exchange information but also serve as forums
for cities to make emission-reduction pledges and monitor as well as
verify emissions.101
97. Thirty U.S. states have climate action plans. For a description of each, see The
Center for Climate Strategies, U.S. Climate Policy Action, http://www.climatestrategies.us
(last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
98. See generally MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER:
DETAILED EMISSIONS AND ECONOMIC MODELING, at annex 3 (2008), http://www.ec.
gc.ca/doc/virage-corner/2008-03/571/Annex3_eng.htm; see also COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION,
CLIMATE CHANGE: LEADING PRACTICES BY PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS
IN CANADA (2007), available at http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/CCInventory
Aug3_EN.pdf.
99. Rabe, supra note 5, at 424; see generally Carbon Tax Act, 2008 S.B.C., ch. 40 (Can.).
100. City initiatives include the Climate Protection Agreement, U.S. Conference of
Mayors, Climate Protection Agreement, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm
(last visited Nov. 1, 2009) and the C40, C40 Cities: Climate Leadership Group,
http://www.c40cities.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
101. For example, under the Cities for Climate Protection Program, which includes
166 cities from Canada, 466 from the U.S., and 4 from Mexico, participating cities make
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One of the most significant developments at the sub-national level is
the growth of sub-regional governance structures, such as the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI). Not only are sub-regional initiatives identifying targets and
providing forums for voluntary coordination, but they are also creating
more institutionalized governance structures, such as cap-and-trade
programs.102 Sub-regional initiatives are now expanding transnationally
and are actively exploring opportunities to integrate their own activities
with other groups, including linking trading programs. The WCI
framework includes participants and observers from Canada and
Mexico, and the Draft design of the Regional Cap-and-Trade Program
specifically allows for offset programs located in Canada, the U.S., or
Mexico to be certified for use within WCI jurisdictions. One challenge
to the continued expansion of these sub-regional initiatives is the
respective constitutional constraints placed on sub-state governments to
engage in foreign relations and to build sub-regional institutions.103
IV. PROSPECTS FOR NORTH AMERICAN REGIONAL COOPERATION
A. Why Regionalism?
Climate change is a global problem. North American states cannot,
without the cooperation of other major GHG emitter states, solve it.
North American emissions make up approximately 23% of the global
total emissions, with that relative share decreasing as developing states
with higher rates of emissions growth increase their contributions to
global totals.104 Thus, any GHG-mitigation measures undertaken on a
regional basis will be insufficient. In light of the global nature of the
climate-change problem, why might regional solutions be attractive?
First, there exist some associated problems arising from climate
change that have regional level consequences. There will, for example,

reduction pledges, develop a local plan to achieve those targets, and monitor the results.
See ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, Cities for Climate Protection, http://www.
iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
102. See, e.g., WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2008), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.
org/component/remository/func-startdown/14.
103. See generally Douglas Kysar & Bernadette Meyer, Like a Nation State, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008) (discussing constitutional challenges to state-based climate
policies in the U.S.); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change,
and the Constitution, 24 ENVTL. F. 4 (2008).
104. See supra Table 1. For a discussion of GHG emission trends, see generally
KEVIN BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS:
GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11-16 (2005), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/navigating_numbers.pdf.
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be ecosystem impacts that transcend national boundaries. In the North
American context, shared freshwater resources, including ground water
resources, are predicted to become further stressed by climate change,
requiring heightened trans-boundary management.105 Climate change
may also impact the ranges of species within a region, leading to
conservation concerns and increased opportunities for invasive species
proliferation.106 In these areas, North American countries are already
cooperating on a bi-lateral and tri-lateral basis through institutions such
as the International Joint Commission, the International and Boundary
Water Commission, and the North American Committee for Wildlife
and Ecosystem Conservation and Management. There is increasing
scientific evidence that addressing air quality issues alongside climate
considerations would be beneficial.107 For example, some short-lived air
pollutants, such as ozone and black carbon (soot), impact climate
change. In the U.S., there is increasing pressure on the government to
include carbon dioxide as a regulated substance under the Clean Act Air,
particularly in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA.108 The CEC has developed expertise in tracking
air pollutants on a regional basis, which already links carbon dioxide
regulation with broader air quality concerns.109 In addition, air quality is
also addressed bi-laterally through the Canada- U.S. Air Quality
Agreement.110 Betsill notes, with specific reference to climate change
and air quality issues, that one of the advantages of regional governance
is that it provides opportunities for issue linkages, which in turn may

105. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 619 (2008).
106. Id.; see Thomas Homer-Dixon, Positive Feedbacks, Dynamic Ice Sheets, and
the Recarbonization of the Global Fuel Supply: The New Sense of Urgency About Global
Warming, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 37, 44-45 (Steven
Bernstein et al. eds., 2008).
107. See generally D. Shindell et al., Climate Forcing and Air Quality Change Due
to Regional Emissions Reductions by Economic Sector, 8 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY &
PHYSICS 7101 (2008), available at www.atmos-chem-phys.net/8/7101/2008.
108. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding that the EPA
does have the authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act).
109. CEC, supra note 65; see Betsill, supra note 61.
110. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government
of Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. No. 11,783 reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 676.
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allow for policy issues to gain stronger traction where they are bundled
with issues of higher salience.111
Second, many of the economic impacts from climate change may also
be regional in scope. For example, the economic losses associated with
climate-change impacts in Mexico may place additional labor migration
pressures on the U.S.112 Consequently, the U.S. may benefit more by
focusing its adaptation efforts on a regional basis, rather than on a global
basis. Also, because of considerable economic interdependence,
economic losses in one part of North America may have a stronger
potential to impact other parts of the region. Thus, while Canada may
have low vulnerability to the direct effects of climate change, it
nevertheless has a strong interest in ensuring that its economic partners’
losses from climate change are minimized.
The high degree of economic integration further militates in favor of
regional solutions. In sectors, such as energy and transportation, where
compliance with climate-change policies is likely to be significant, there
will be pressure for states to maintain sectoral competitiveness.113
Similarly, in the event of high degrees of asymmetry in climate-change
commitments, there may be heightened concerns that firms will locate in
jurisdictions with less onerous requirements, referred to as “environmental
leakage.”114 Leakage is more likely to occur in areas where capital is
mobile and market access is unaffected by relocation to areas with lower
regulatory burdens. These conditions favor regional cooperation in
North America given the open market access and strong investor
protection measures available under NAFTA. There exists a need to
study on a sectoral basis whether the gains from shifting GHG-intensive
activity to areas with less onerous GHG regulation are sufficient to incur
the attendant costs. Competitiveness concerns have influenced U.S.
decisions to seek international agreements on other environmental
issues. In particular, Beth DeSombre has shown that in a number of
instances where the U.S. has been willing to act unilaterally on an

111. Betsill, supra note 61, at 14. But note that Betsill remains skeptical of the
ability of the CEC to capitalize on these linkages, concluding that “synergies between air
quality policies and climate mitigation policies are possible but not assured.” Id. at 20.
112. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 56 (2007),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm; see also Nils
Petter Gleditsch et al., Climate Change and Conflict: The Migration Link 1, 6 (May
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/
cwc_working_paper_climate_change.pdf.
113. See generally Robert Page, Kyoto and Emissions Trading: Challenges for the
NAFTA Family, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 55, 56 (2002).
114. See discussion of “leakage” in SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT
383 (2003). The extent of economic leakage requires careful empirical analysis, as firm
location is determined by a variety of factors unrelated to the extent of regulatory burden.
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environmental issue, affected industry groups seek internalization of that
issue in order to maintain competitive parity.115
A further advantage to regional climate-change cooperation is that it is
likely to provide greater opportunities for cost-effective reductions. The
most prominent examples of this are both the use of emissions trading
and joint implementation, which are means to increase cost effectiveness
on a regional (Europe) and sub-regional (RGGI and WCI) basis. While
there exists at present no national emissions-trading systems, both the
U.S. and Canada are preparing to launch national cap-and-trade systems.
The sub-regional systems are anticipated to operate on a transnational
basis. Canadian policies anticipate the creation of tradable credits, as
does the Mexican policy. Both Canada and Mexico have had experience
with using international credits under the CDM, and Canada continues to
rely on CDM-type credits into the future. In the event that Canada does
not agree to continue within the Kyoto framework, there will be a
demand for an alternative mechanism to generate credits.
A necessary condition for establishing market mechanisms to trade
emission credits is a robust system of GHG emission-tracking in order to
ensure that credits granted are genuine reductions and permanent in
nature. Strong emissions inventory capacity will also facilitate the integration
of multiple crediting systems, which permits different regional actors to
pursue a variety of approaches while allowing flexibility through trading.
As an example, the WCI draft trading regime anticipates developing
rules for the incorporation of British Columbia’s carbon tax into its
system of credits.116 In this regard, North America is well positioned as
a region because each country has well-developed capacities in emission
calculation and inventory tracking. The GHG inventories are all based
on UNFCCC methodologies and should be compatible.
Integrated carbon markets on a regional scale may offer less flexibility
than global markets. However, regional transaction costs can make the
development of smaller markets, which may be linked to other markets
in the future, a preferable strategy. There is some evidence that this is in
fact the preferred direction of North American states. Mexico’s
description of the development of its domestic carbon market indicates a
progressive movement from a price-controlled system to one that is

115. ELIZABETH R. DESOMBRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 42, 43 (2000).
116. Id.
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eventually integrated with international markets. Canada also appears
set to use centrally controlled carbon prices (to determine a firm’s
contribution rate to the technology fund, as an alternative to mandated
reductions) with future integration. The Canadian offset system does not
now allow for the use of offsets or allowances from projects outside
Canada,117 but cooperative efforts could provide opportunities for
regional offsets. For example, the proposed structure of the WCI capand-trade program allows for up to 49% (per regulated entity) of a
reduction obligation to be satisfied by offsets or allowances from other
systems, so long as those projects are subject to “comparably rigorous
oversight,”118 possibly a task that can be designated to an existing
institution. In response to the announcement by the U.S. administration
that the U.S. would seek to implement a national cap-and-trade program,
Canada has actively sought to negotiate a continental emission trading
agreement with the U.S. and Mexico.119
A final factor that militates in favor of regional climate-change
cooperation is the presence of pre-existing governance institutions, both
formal and informal. Regional environmental governance in North
America is weak. There are few regional environmental institutions, and
those that exist do not operate autonomously from national governments.
The most prominent among these is the CEC. However, the CEC at this
time is not well suited as a forum for climate governance because the
Council is made up exclusively of environment ministers. In each of the
three North American states, climate-change policy is not the exclusive
responsibility of environment ministries, and there has been a considerable
amount of inter-ministry competition over climate change.120 It is
unlikely that national governments will confer significant climatechange policy functions upon the CEC.121 However, the CEC may play
a more invigorated role in coordinating research activity, particularly in
117. MINISTER OF ENV’T, GOV’T OF CAN., TURNING THE CORNER: CANADA’S OFFSET
SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 13 (2008), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/
collection_2009/ec/En84-42-4-2008E.pdf.
118. See WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 102, at 10-11.
119. MICHAËLLE JEAN, PROTECTING CANADA’S FUTURE: SPEECH FROM THE THRONE
11 (2008), available at http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sftddt-e.pdf; see Alexander
Panetta & Steve Rennie, Canada to Seek Climate Deal with Obama, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Nov. 5, 2008.
120. Simone Pulver, Climate Politics in Mexico in a North American Perspective,
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLITICS IN NORTH AMERICA: THE STATE OF PLAY 49, 58 (Henrik
Selen & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 2006) available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/
pubs/CI_OccPaper_ClimateChange3.pdf; Stephen Bernstein, International Institutions and
the Framing of Domestic Policies: The Kyoto Protocol and Canada’s Response to
Climate Change, 35 POL’Y SCI. 203, 215 (2002).
121. For a discussion of the CEC as a forum for emissions trading, see generally
Betsill, supra note 61.
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areas where it already has developed expertise, such as in environmental
impacts from trade. 122 In many ways, the CEC is an anomalous
institution in North America, where the preference has been to resolve
environmental concerns bi-laterally and without the creation of
institutions. In those instances where institutions have been created,
such as the International Joint Commission, a preference remains not to
delegate policy making and dispute resolution functions to international
bodies.123
The SPP provides an alternative forum and model for regional
cooperation; one that is more decentralized and sectorally driven. If the
Joint Leaders statement from New Orleans (quoted above) is an
indication of the kind of cooperative measures that might be undertaken
through the SPP, then one would expect cooperative efforts to be
discrete and conducted with little attention to broader integration. For
example, the Energy Working Group’s agenda includes matters relating
to climate change, such as enhanced research and development cooperation
on clean technologies and energy efficiency. Yet, it also includes
measures to increase oil sands production (presumably as a matter of
energy security).124 To date, the outcomes of the SPP process relating to
clean energy have been modest; however, in 2007, the three
governments did enter into an agreement on clean energy research and
development cooperation.125
The forms of cooperation under the SPP to date suggest that it may be
ill suited as a governance structure for comprehensive climate change

122. For example, under Article 13 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may initiate
reports on a broad range of environmental matters. NAAEC, supra note 57, at art. 13.
To date, the Secretariat has produced reports on matters relevant to climate policy such
as continental electricity cooperation and green building standards. CEC SECRETARIAT,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE EVOLVING NORTH AMERICAN
ELECTRICITY MARKET (2002), available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/index_
programs.cfm?programId=5&varlan=english; CEC SECRETARIAT, GREEN BUILDING IN
NORTH AMERICA, available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/index_programs.cfm?
programId=5&varlan=english.
123. See generally Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate
of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 273 (1998).
124. See generally SPP, THE OIL SANDS WORKSHOP SPP REPORT (2006), available at
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/oilgas_generalpubs/oilsands_spp_report
_ 2.pdf.
125. Agreement Among the Government of Canada, the Government of the United
Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in
Energy Science and Technology, U.S.-Can.-Mex., July 23, 2007, http://www.sener.
gob.mx/webSener/res/473/AGREEMENT%20CANADA%20MEXICO%20USA.pdf.
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regulation. Debora VanNijnatten argues that the environmental objectives
of the SPP are insufficiently linked with the broader economic agenda of
the SPP, creating barriers to comprehensive and sustainable decisionmaking.126 The economic bias of the SPP is also evidenced in the
privileged position that business and industry leaders are given within
the broader SPP structure through the North American Competitiveness
Council, which provides guidance directly to the ministers responsible
for the SPP agenda. There is no comparable avenue of consultation for
civil society groups.127 The result is that the SPP suffers from a
considerable legitimacy deficit. A potential structural advantage of the
SPP is that the process has been subject to strong executive oversight,
which allows for regional priorities to be set and for central governments
to consider the broader implications of sectoral initiatives. It also
provides opportunities for central governments to better integrate climate
policies across different sectors.
At more informal levels, strong institutional connections exist among
the three American states addressing climate change. As indicated in
Table 1, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. participate in a significant number of
common initiatives internationally, many of which are structured as
loose networks set up for the purpose of exchanging information. There
are increasing examples of sub-national environmental cooperation, such
as the New England Governors—Eastern Canadian Premiers, which
established a climate change action plan in 2001, the Midwestern
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, established in 2007, and
the WCI, which expanded to include Canadian provinces. Outside the
climate change area, there are examples of multi-level governance
structures. For example, the Canada U.S. Air Quality Committee, a bilateral committee created to implement the Canada-U.S. Air Quality
Agreement, comprises both federal officials and officials from several
border states and provinces.128 On the U.S.–Mexico border, there has
been a long history of environmental cooperation through the 1983 La
Paz Agreement,129 the Border Environment Cooperation Commission,130
126. Debora VanNijnatten, The Security and Prosperity Agreement as an Indicator
Species for the Emerging North American Environmental Regime, 35 POL. & POL’Y 664,
670-73 (2007).
127. Craik & DiMento, supra note 69, at 493-94.
128. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government
of Canada on Air Quality, supra note 100, at art. VIII.
129. Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border
Area, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1025.
130. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 16, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1545; see Welcome: Border Environment Cooperation Commission, http://www.cocef.
org/ingles.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
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and joint projects between federal environmental regulators, such as
Border 2012.131 The result is a dense web of overlapping policy initiatives
and a growing network of officials familiar with climate change initiatives
and broader sustainability agendas within North America. This, in turn,
improves opportunities for policy diffusion and allows bureaucrats to
exercise influence over the broader policy agenda by linking initiatives.132
Many of these initiatives have a regional or sub-regional orientation, so
there is likely to be a path dependant bias in favor of continuing these
arrangements on the same scale, with opportunities for incremental
enlargement. This appears to be the trajectory of the sub-regional climate
change initiatives.
Regional cooperation allows for like-minded states to maximize their
depth of cooperation, where agreement cannot be met on a global level.
Europe, for example, has adopted regional commitments to reduce GHG
emissions in the absence of, but clearly in the hope of affecting, broader
global commitments on deeper, economy-wide reductions. A similar
dynamic is evident in the sub-regional cooperation in the U.S., where
some states have developed cooperative institutions in the absence of
agreement at the national level. In North America, the most striking
commonality, at least between Canada and the U.S., is the move away
from the short-term, fixed, economy-wide emission reduction commitments
found in the Kyoto Protocol, while still accepting long-term targets and
the broader global objectives and principles found in the UNFCCC. The
levels of commitment that Canada and the U.S. are prepared to agree to,
particularly in the short and medium term, are similar, in that both
countries prefer shallow reduction commitments deepening over time.
There is a strong premium on economic certainty in both countries, as
demonstrated by the preference for intensity-based targets. Mexico
maintains a commitment to the principle of differentiated responsibilities,
but nevertheless appears to be prepared to identify emission reduction
targets. Canada and the U.S. have repeatedly affirmed their own
commitment to this principle, but have insisted that major developing
economies take some steps towards reduction, which is consistent with
the Mexican position.
131. See EPA, U.S.-Mexico Border 2012, http://www.epa.gov/Border2012 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009).
132. See generally Henrik Selin & Stacy VanDeveer, Climate Leadership in
Northeast North America (May 18, 2006), http://wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/papervan
deveer1.pdf; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 172-77 (2004).
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B. Likely Characteristics of North American Climate
Change Governance
Flowing from this discussion, there are a number of characteristics
that North American climate change governance structures are likely to
exhibit. First, the approach taken to climate regulation is likely to be
“bottom-up” in the sense that individual jurisdictions, at both the federal
and sub-national levels, will put forward commitments based on their
particular circumstances.133 Regional initiatives will be directed at
coordinating those efforts by promoting comparability of emissions,
sharing expertise, and enhancing the efficiency of emissions reduction
through market mechanisms. A bottom-up approach suggests that North
American climate policy will be more focused on implementation than
commitment creation. A bottom-up approach does not necessarily mean
that national governments will not agree to binding emission-reduction
targets, but these are more likely to occur in the context of multi-lateral
negotiations. The absence of hierarchical regional governance structures
strongly militates against binding regional commitments or highly
institutionalized approaches to implementation at the regional level, such
as those that exist in the EU. Unlike the EU, there are no institutions
that would provide compliance or dispute settlement functions, and such
institutions are not likely to develop.134
Bottom-up approaches will be better able to account for the division of
legislative authority over climate change that exists in North America
and will allow existing sub-regional initiatives to develop. In Canada,
the federal climate-change policy has been developed so as to co-exist
with provincial initiatives. The U.S. federal government has not, to date,
sought to play a coordinating role among states, and there are some
indications that increased federal oversight of climate policy will result
in the pre-emption of some state-based initiatives. But draft legislation
appears to maintain a role for state programs.135 A bottom-up approach
may also appeal to the Mexican government, which appears set to define
133. “Bottom-up” approaches are described and advocated by David G. Victor,
Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of
Effective Architectures, in ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 133, 139-40, 151 (Joseph Aldy & Robert
Stavins eds., 2007) and Scott Barrett, A Multi Track Climate Treaty System, in
ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POSTKYOTO WORLD, supra, at 237, 240-41.
134. Even in the highly legalized area of North American trade law, the preference
has been not to create permanent dispute-settlement bodies.
135. For example, under the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 335 (2009), state trading programs, such as those
contemplated under RGGI and WCI would be suspended, but other state initiatives are
not affected.
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reduction targets, even though they will likely be non-binding. Because
the degree of environmental policy centralization differs across the
North American states, there may also be a need to accommodate
different governmental levels within single-governance structures.
A bottom-up strategy also allows for the continued development of
multiple approaches to emissions mitigation and adaptation measures.
Thus, a second characteristic is that North American climate governance
will continue to accommodate multiple approaches, allowing states and
sub-national governments to choose those approaches that suit their
circumstances. Again, this is already evident within sub-national
governments.136 British Columbia has chosen, for example, to use a
carbon tax, while California has enacted carbon dioxide limits for motor
vehicles, an approach that is less likely to be embraced in jurisdictions
with strong automobile-manufacturing sectors.137 The advantage in
allowing for differentiated regional and sub-regional approaches is that
jurisdictions and sectors that are policy leaders can be exemplars for
policy experimentation, which can provide greater certainty to reluctant
jurisdictions or sectors by demonstrating how reductions may be
implemented without unacceptable economic impact, leading to
diffusion and enlargement.138
Among the approaches likely to be adopted is a cap-and-trade system
that provides for participation of all three North American states.
Following from above, it is less likely that the parties will establish a
unitary continental cap-and-trade system. Instead, the architecture is
more likely to build on national and sub-regional systems and provide
linkage opportunities between systems through inter-system trading and
offsets. The caps themselves may be set globally and allocated under
national or sub-national rules. Allowing each state to determine the
coverage of a cap-and-trade system ensures that states may design their
own systems in accordance with the structure of their economy and in
light of sub-regional interests. Cooperation would be required in order
136. For a summary of U.S. state climate action plans, see The Center for Climate
Strategies, supra note 97.
137. For example, Ontario has joined the WCI without accepting the California auto
emission requirements. See Karen Howlett & Greg Keenan, Deal Lets Ontario Join
Climate-change Drive, G LOBE & M AIL (Toronto), Aug. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.unep.org/cpi/briefs/2008Aug05.doc.
138. See BARRY G. RABE, SECOND GENERATION CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE AMERICAN
STATES: PROLIFERATION, DIFFUSION, AND REGIONALIZATION 20 (2006), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/08energy_rabe.pdf.
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to ensure that inter-jurisdiction credits are verifiable, permanent and
additional. Adopting common methodologies for the calculation and
verification of credits would be desirable and ought to be more easily
achieved on a regional scale. The concerns over CDM credit verification
and additionality suggest that systems may be more effectively
implemented among parties, where there is a high degree of trust and
transparency—139 conditions that are more apt to arise among regional
trading partners that have high levels of existing integration.
A third characteristic of regional climate governance in North
America is that it is likely to include sectoral approaches. Sectoral
approaches are currently used in both the APP and the SPP; as a result,
there may be a path dependant bias in favor of these existing networks.
Both Canada and Mexico have identified specific sectors for emission
reductions.140 Determining which sectors may be amenable to regional
agreements requires further research assessing, inter alia, the degree to
which the sector operates within a distinct regional market, whether the
sector accounts for significant amounts of regional GHGs, the extent to
which the sector’s capital stock will require renewal, and the ability to
reduce emissions costs effectively.141
A fourth characteristic is the reliance on research- and developmentbased approaches. Funding research and development has been a significant
part of existing national climate-change policies, both domestically and
internationally. Research and development cooperation on a regional
scale, as opposed to a global scale, requires special conditions because
the major advantage of research cooperation is being able to pool funds
from as many countries as possible, with a particular emphasis on
including technologically advanced countries. For example, both Canada
and the U.S. have a particular interest in developing CCS technology,
which may itself be deployed on a regional or sub-regional scale;
capture opportunities may not be located near storage opportunities.142
CCS may also be an example of a technology that has regional political
139. See generally Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s
Performance and Potential, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2008).
140. On sectoral approaches, with specific reference to Mexico, see generally CTR.
FOR CLEAN AIR POL’Y, INTERIM REPORT: SECTORAL APPROACHES: A PATHWAY TO
NATIONALLY APPROPRIATE MITIGATION MEASURES (2008), http://www.ccap.org/docs/
resources/560/CCAP-sectoral%20interim%20report%20final%20012209.pdf.
141. See Bodansky, supra note 29, at 9-11.
142. For example, the Weyburn II CO2 Storage Project collects CO2 from a coal
gasification plant in North Dakota and transports the gas via pipeline to an oilfield in
Saskatchewan. See IEA Greenhouse and Gas R&D Programme, Project Details, http://www.
co2captureandstorage.info/project_specific.php?project_id=140. For a more
general discussion of CCS, see generally IPCC, Special Report on Carbon Dioxide
Capture and Storage (2005), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/
srccs_wholereport.pdf.
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advantages that favor its development in North America more than
elsewhere. In the U.S., CCS would allow for the continued use of coal
and in Canada it would allow for the continued development of the oil
sands, perhaps satisfying the demands to two powerful sectoral lobbies,
both of which have sub-regional power bases. 143 Research and
development may be used in conjunction with sectoral approaches that
would lead to cooperation on a regional scale. Barrett argues that the
benefits from research-based approaches can be better realized where
there is standardization allowing participants to take advantage of
economies of scale and network effects.144 Standardization on a regional
level, such as renewable portfolio standards, could then be coupled with
research and development cooperation, in renewable energy technologies.
Funding for research and development on climate change is unlikely
to be centralized at a regional level in the short or medium term. The
North American Development Bank, created as part of the U.S.-Mexico
Border Environment Cooperation Commission has not yet focused on
climate- or energy-related projects.145 Mexico is a participant in the
Inter-American Development Bank that does have a climate-change
program,146 but Canada and the U.S. are not partners in that institution.
In the absence of a regional equivalent of the Global Environment
Facility, research and development funding is more likely to continue on
its current project or sector-based trajectory.147
A final point regarding regional climate governance is the critical
requirement for integration. Regional climate governance is not an
alternative to global solutions but, rather, must be understood chiefly as
a scale for implementation. In the case of North America, where there is
a high premium placed on short term flexibility, the environmental
integrity of such an approach depends upon both vertical integration
with multi-lateral commitments and processes as well as horizontal
integration across regional and sub-regional programs and policies. In
the absence of strong regional institutions, the form of integration is

143. BARRETT, supra note 114, at 253, makes this point in relation to coal.
144. Scott Barrett, supra note 133, at 251.
145. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, supra note 130, at ch. 2.
146. See Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Energy and Climate Change
Initiative, http://www.iadb.org/secci/aboutus.cfm?language=English (last visited Nov. 2,
2009).
147. As seen in the APP, for example.
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unlikely to be hierarchical and coercive.148 Instead, integration efforts
will need to focus on comparability and complementarity. Comparability is
crucial to promote reciprocity among governance units at various scales.
To a large degree, the acceptance of UNFCCC methodologies in emissions
inventories and accounting facilitates comparisons between governance
units, but, as forms of emissions-regulation proliferate, more programand project-specific forms of accounting will need to be developed and
adopted. For example, the International Organization for Standards
provides an important source of GHG accounting and verification tools
that could be incorporated into a wide variety of instruments.149
The greater challenge for integration in a decentralized regulatory
architecture is promoting linkages between various programs. One
example of this challenge is the different forms of eligible renewable
energy that may form part of a renewable portfolio standard. There
remains considerable controversy over the role of large-scale hydro and
nuclear energy within renewable portfolios.150 Ensuring that emissions
reduction projects are creditable within various emission trading systems
(and ensuring that projects do not get double counted) will also require a
high degree of cooperation between market operators.151 Coordination
at the regional level can promote key standards for accounting and for
transparency with a view to maximizing the scope of emission trading
and other credit-based systems, both within the region and with market
instruments outside the region.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO
In many respects, Mexico differs from its North American partners,
with different international commitments and a greater emphasis on
continued economic development and adaptation. These differences are
not, however, incompatible with regional climate governance. On an
abstract level, the participation of a developing country in emission
reduction initiatives provides an important signal to other developing
economies that emission reduction is not incompatible with development

148. For example, the EU is able to aggregate and reallocate individual emissions
commitments—the EU bubble—through regional legal instruments.
149. See International Organization for Standardization, Hot Topics: Climate Change,
http://www.iso.org/iso/hot_topics/hot_topics_climate_change.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
150. CEC, WHAT IS RENEWABLE?: A SUMMARY OF ELIGIBLE CRITERIA ACROSS 27
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ECONOMY/
What-is-Renewable_EN.pdf; see Ian H. Rowlands, Renewable Electricity Politics
Across Borders 64-67 (May 10, 2007), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/
paperrowlands1.pdf (discussing trade law implications of treating different sources of
renewable energy unequally).
151. See, e.g., WCI, supra note 102, at 10-11 (stressing rigorous accounting for credits).
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goals. Given the U.S. government’s strong insistence that other major
emitters, such as India and China, need to take steps to reduce their
business-as-usual emissions, Mexican involvement ought to be politically
attractive.
Symbols aside, regional cooperation will need to provide suitable
incentives in order to address Mexico’s development and adaptation
needs. Important initial steps will be the identification of emissions
reduction targets and continued development of national emissions
inventory and accounting systems.152 If Mexico can identify opportunities
for efficient reductions, it should be able to attract investment in order to
realize those mitigation opportunities. Mexico’s current experience with
generating CDM credits under the Kyoto Protocol indicates a strong
existing capacity, but it will need to build on that to continue to attract
those investment funds in a more competitive environment. A regional
climate-change framework that provides for the transfer of credit
reduction units between countries presents a potential advantage to
Mexico. Mexico, as the sole developing country, should be able to
attract strong investment from the U.S. and Canada. In the event that
Canada no longer continues within the Kyoto framework after 2012, the
Canadian government will need to replace the CDM credits currently
included in its own GHG reduction plan with an alternative. Mexico
would likely want to ensure that a regional system is supplemental to the
CDM under Kyoto since Mexico has been able to attract a high
proportion of investment under the CDM.153 Ensuring that North
American initiatives use similar methodologies to those accepted under
the CDM should help attract investment under both a regional system
and under Kyoto. A regional system may provide opportunities for
credits in areas such as land-use change, which Mexico has identified as

152. One system that is already recognized internationally as strong is the Climate
Change Performance Index, http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ccpi.htm (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009).
153. Mexico has attracted 6.32% of the registered projects under the CDM, an
amount only exceeded by China (34.77), India (24.73.%), and Brazil (8.76%). Note
these statistics measure only project numbers and not the total amount of certified
emission reduction credits. In this latter regard, Mexico has a much smaller share
(2.89%) of the global CDM market compared with China and India. UNFCCC, CDC,
Registerd Project Activities by Host Party, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html (last updated June 11, 2009) (last
visited Nov. 6, 2009).
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being a significant source of net GHG reductions, not currently available
for credit under the CDM.
Given their affirmation of common but differentiated responsibilities,
Canada and the U.S. are not likely going to insist that Mexico accept
binding reduction targets, but “no lose” targets or targets that are linked
to increases in GDP or carbon intensity levels may provide opportunities
for joint implementation. The acceptance of targets by Mexico may
facilitate investment because the presence of targets allows for better
demonstration that reductions are real (and not so-called “hot air”).154
One possible option that may make the acceptance of binding targets
more feasible for Mexico is the negotiation of some form of side
payment. A side payment could be linked to capacity-building,
technology acquisition, or adaptation requirements. Negotiating side
payments may be easier in a regional context where the case can be
made that such payments strengthen the region as a whole. A regional
system may be better able to respond to the particular needs of Mexico
than strictly within the current global framework that tends to view
developing countries in an undifferentiated fashion.
There is no North American equivalent to the Global Environment
Facility that provides climate-change project-financing. The individual
development agencies in Canada and the U.S. have provided climatechange-related funding. For example, the Canadian International
Development Agency has a climate-change development fund and
USAID has a similar program.155 The overlapping mandates of these
programs may provide opportunities for regionally focused cooperation.
The decentralized nature of climate-change governance in North
America may present some additional challenges in Mexico where state
governments and cities are likely to have different capacity levels among
one another, as well as lower capacity levels than their North American
counterparts.156 The result may be the development of greater ties
between the Mexican federal government and sub-state governments and

154. “Hot air” is the term often given to projects that do not meet the requirement of
additionality; that is, that the reductions go beyond business-as-usual reductions.
155. The Canada Climate Change Development Fund is described at Canadian
International Development Agency, Canada Climate Change Development Fund, http://
www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/home (click “Programs” on the left;
then click “Specific Programs” on the left; then click “Canada Climate Change Development
Program” on the left) (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). The USAID Global Climate Change
Program is described at USAID Environment: Climate Change Program, Overview,
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
156. The exception to this is Mexico City, which has a sophisticated and ambitious
climate-change plan. See Programa de Acción Climática de la Ciudad de México (last
visited Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.df.gob.mx/wb/gdf/programa_de_accion_climatica
(last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
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sub-regional climate institutions. Another possibility is direct engagement
by private sector actors in sub-regional climate programs. For example,
many of the current cooperative initiatives are structured around sectoral
working groups. These working groups are not currently set up to
facilitate capacity-building, and this may hamper their effectiveness.
Mexico’s ability to link GHG mitigation with development and
adaptation will also be impacted by the decentralized structure of climate
governance, as sub-national actors in Canada and the U.S. will have
different levels of interests in Mexican economic affairs. Decentralized
governance may also present opportunities for the Mexican government
to develop cooperative arrangements with U.S. states that face similar
climate-change impacts, such as increased water stress and impacts from
sea level rises.
Thus, for Mexico, the need for integration operates on a variety of
levels. In order to maintain the current flow of benefits through the
Kyoto mechanisms, Mexico will want to ensure that regional climatechange programs are compatible with international credit-based programs.
Horizontal integration is also important because integration of different
programs will facilitate issue-linkage, and that may better enable Mexico
to leverage its involvement in mitigation measures in order to achieve its
other climate-related goals.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to examine the potential for regional climatechange governance in North America and to further consider the
possible approaches to climate-change regulation that are more likely to
be pursued in the short and medium term. Our conclusions suggest that
regional climate governance is likely to arise but in a decentralized
fashion and oriented more towards implementation than commitmentcreation. Unlike Europe, the absence of strong regional institutions and
a fragmented system of resource and environment regulation militates
against a law-based and hierarchical system of regional climate
governance. However, a regional approach may be attractive in those
sectors that are highly integrated within the NAFTA trade area, where
leakage and competitiveness concerns are higher. The common focus on
developing innovative technologies through direct research and
development funding provides further opportunities for cooperation.
We are confident that regional cooperation deserves further study and
consideration by policy officials in North America. We have identified
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several areas that, in our view, require further attention. First, greater
consideration needs to be given to the impact that the distribution of
legislative authority over key climate-related areas in each state may
have on the structure of cooperation. While all three states have a
federal structure, the distribution of powers differs from state to state, as
does the ability of sub-national actors to engage in cooperative activities
within and beyond the state. Second, the contribution of existing
regional environmental institutions to climate governance needs to be
better understood. New institutions are costly to create, but delegating
authority to ill-suited institutions also has costs. There is a need to
consider, inter alia, the principal actors engaged within the institution,
existing levels of expertise in climate change, the kinds of cooperative
activities the institution can engage in, and the form of decision-making
processes available to the institution. The last point is particularly
important because legitimacy questions, which tend to arise as
institutions take on more prominent governmental roles, have been raised
in relation to existing regional arrangements.157 Third, methodologies for
identifying those sectors that may be amenable to regional climate
change cooperation need to be developed and then applied to leading
sectoral candidates. We expect that sectoral analysis will be principally
an economic undertaking, but there are also important governancerelated questions regarding the nature and form of sectoral cooperation.
Lastly, further consideration must be given to the governance of
integration. A principal form of regional governance may be a form of
meta-cooperation, whereby different programs and tracks are linked with
one another vertically and horizontally. More ambitious forms of
integration may provide greater benefits in terms of efficiency but may
conflict with the desire for flexibility.

157.
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APPENDIX 1

Canada

U.S.

Mexico

GLOBAL INITIATIVES

UNFCCC

Kyoto

• Submitting a national inventory
of emissions and removals of
greenhouse gases.
• Implementing national programs
to mitigate climate change and
adapt to its impacts.
• Strengthening scientific and
technical research and systematic
observation related to the climate
system, and promoting the
development and diffusion of
relevant technologies.
• Promoting education programs
and public awareness about
climate change and its likely
effects.
• Periodically submitting
comprehensive National
Communications (i.e., reports)
on activities to implement
commitments under the
Convention.
• Developing a national policy and
specific commitments.
• Assisting developing countries to
meet their goals through
financial aid, technology transfer
and research support.
-6% below 1990
-7% below
levels by
1990 levels

Same as Canada and the
US, however Mexico is
NOT required to develop
a national policy and
specific commitments
nor to assist developing
countries through
financial aid, tech
transfer or research
support

None
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Protocol

CDM

Bali
Action
Roadmap

2008/2012
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by 2008/2012
[has not yet
ratified Kyoto
Protocol so
not legally
bound by
target]

Assisting with 22
projects, none with
Mexico (11 in
South America, 4
in China, 6 in
Malaysia and 1 in
Egypt)

118 projects, most in
conjunction with UK and
Switzerland, some with
Spain and 14 simply
Mexico
[11 climate change
projects approved
through GEF]
Calls for enhanced action on all of the UNFCCC
points from all parties.
Indicates final negotiations/decisions will take
place at COP-15 in 2009.
None

NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVES

NAAEC

The NAAEC requires that each Party ensure its laws
provide for high levels of environmental protection
without lowering standards to attract investment. Each
Party agrees to effectively enforce its environmental laws
through the use of inspectors, monitoring compliance and
pursuing the necessary legal means to seek appropriate
remedies for violations. Each Party must also provide a
report on the state of its environment, develop
environmental emergency preparedness measures,
promote environmental education, research and
development, assess environmental impacts and promote
the use of economic instruments. Parties may also appoint
National Advisory Committees composed of private
sector representatives to assist in implementing the
Agreement domestically. [from NAAEC Canadian
Office website: http://www.naaec.gc.ca/eng/agreement/
agreement_e.htm]
•

SPP
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working towards a joint vision of biofuels for
transportation by 2020.
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•

shared information on policies and programs on
vehicle fuel efficiency, standby power consumption,
and the potential for natural gas to support optimal
energy use for the future.
• harmonize a number of energy-using consumer
products, such as central air conditioners.
• new suite of products, including clothes washers and
water heaters, are being assessed under the new
framework to systematize energy efficiency
harmonization between all three countries.
• undertook a comprehensive analysis of various
emissions inventories among the three countries to
prepare a trilateral strategy to achieve comparability.
• road tested emissions estimation methodologies for
nine energy generating facilities to improve and
harmonize emissions calculations in the energy
power.
• enhance our electricity networks.
• collaboration to further reduce barriers to expanding
clean energy technologies, especially carbon dioxide
capture and storage to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions.
• working together to improve the safety of chemicals
in the marketplace.
[from “Bali Action Plan” down from Orleans meeting;
first section from “key accomplishments since 2007”]
OTHER INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
•
Asia-Pacific
Partnership

In accordance with our
respective national
circumstances, develop,
deploy and transfer
cleaner, more efficient
technologies and to meet
national pollution
reduction, energy
security and climate
change concerns,

Not a member
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consistent with the
principles UNFCCC.
• Areas for collaboration
may include, but not be
limited to:
• energy efficiency,
• clean coal,
• integrated gasification
combined cycle,
• liquefied natural gas,
• carbon capture and
storage,
• combined heat and
power,
• methane capture and
use,
• civilian nuclear power,
• geothermal,
rural/village energy
systems,
• advanced
transportation,
building and home
construction and
operation,
• bioenergy,
• agriculture and
forestry,
• hydropower, wind
power, solar power,
and other renewables.
• will also cooperate on
the development,
diffusion, deployment
and transfer of longerterm transformational
energy technologies that
will promote economic
growth while enabling
significant reductions in
greenhouse gas
intensities.
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•

Areas for mid- to longterm collaboration may
include, but not be
limited to:
• hydrogen,
• nanotechnologies,
• advanced
biotechnologies,
• next-generation
nuclear fission,
• fusion energy.
• share experiences in
developing and
implementing our
national sustainable
development and energy
strategies, and explore
opportunities to reduce
the greenhouse gas
intensities of our
economies.
• non-binding compact in
which the elements of
this shared vision, as
well as the ways and
means to implement it,
will be further defined.
• we will consider
establishing a framework
for the partnership,
including institutional
and financial
arrangements and ways
to include other
interested and likeminded countries.

OAS

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2002 to
support the CARICOM countries and help their mitigation

239

CRAIK-DIMENTO[1] (DO NOT DELETE)

G8

240

2/5/2016 12:39 PM

efforts with respect to climate change. Canada and the US
have done so through support for climate change projects
in Caribbean.
Does not seem to be any focus on climate change outside
of the concerns of small island states in the Caribbean.
No specific targets in G8 action Not a member but
plan: US President Bush did
participated in summit.
agree economy-wide approach
Called for stronger
needed to achieve absolute
action by developed
emission reductions [agreed to
countries and more
seriously consider 50% by
financial/technical
2050].
assistance for
Action Plan included following developing countries.
elements:
• Reviewing building codes,
appliance standards, and
vehicle standards to identify
best practices and
opportunities for
coordination;
• Extending the use of
labeling on vehicles and
appliances to raise consumer
awareness of energy
consumption;
• Encouraging multilateral
development banks to
expand the use of voluntary
energy savings assessments
of proposed investments in
energy-intensive sectors;
explore opportunities to
increase investments in
renewable energy and
energy efficiency
technologies; and work with
borrower countries to
identify less greenhouse gasintensive growth options.
• Inviting the World Bank to
develop and implement
“best practice” guidelines to
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assess and manage climate
risks associated with new
investments in climatesensitive sectors;
• Adopting, where
appropriate, market-based
policy frameworks to
finance the transition to
cleaner energy; and
• Promoting dialogue on
potential policy approaches
such as long-term sectoral,
national or international
policy frameworks; marketbased instruments for the
development and
deployment of technologies;
and the trading of credits for
greenhouse gas reductions.

Washington
International
Renewable
Energy
Conference

Methane to
Markets
Partnership

[All from Pew Centre
summary; available on G8
website at: http://www.g8summit.
go.jp/eng/doc/doc080714__en.
html]
Wirec 2008 was the third international ministerial level
conference on renewable energy. It was hosted in
Washington on March 4-6, 2008. Ministers from federal
and local governments, industry leaders and civil society
representatives met to focus on R&D issues, rural
development and financing of renewable energy sources.
There was also a focus on sharing best practices.
http://www.wirec2008.gov
21 partners and over 600 private sector and civil society
organizations are members. The Partnership’s goal is to
encourage “waste” methane recovery and to re-use it as a
clean energy source. Currently focuses on four areas of
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methane management: agriculture; coal mines; landfills;
and, oil and gas systems.

International
Partnership
for the
Hydrogen
Economy

Carbon
Sequestration
Leadership
Forum

Group on
Earth
Observations

Generation IV
International
Forum

Global Nuclear
Energy
Partnership

242

http://www.methanetomarkets.org
17 government members,
including the EC, have
Not Involved.
partnered to improve the
development of hydrogen and
fuel cells as an alternative clean
energy source. Focused on
R&D and commercial
utilization activities. Founded
in 2003.
http://www.iphe.net
22 governments partnered since 2003 to develop carbon
sequestration and carbon capture techniques for long-term
storage and transportation. The group includes six task
forces: risk assessment, storage capacity estimation,
projects interaction and review, legal issues, capacitybuilding in emerging economies and financial issues.
http://www.cslforum.org
Over 70 countries and 40 international organizations
participate in GEO. The initiative aims to collect climate
change data, general weather and atmospheric data, and
other environmental statistics. The partnership helps
members coordinate efforts and share information.
http://earthobservations.org
Partnership of ten countries and
Euratom to encourage the
development of safer,
proliferation-resistant nuclear
energy technologies.
http://nuclear.energy.gov/GenI
V/neGenIV2.html
Canada joined in Nov. 2007. In
Sept. 2007, 16 states signed a
Statement of Principles to
cooperate to develop and

Not Involved

Not Involved
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ITER

Global
Bioenergy
Partnership

Renewable
Energy and
Energy
Efficiency
Partnership

Renewable
Energy Policy
Network for

encourage the use of peaceful
nuclear energy technologies
http://nuclear.energy.gov/GenI
V/neGenIV2.html
Research
Not
project initiated
involved
by the US
aimed at
harnessing the
potential of
fusion energy.
China, Russia,
India, Japan,
Korea and the
EU are also
involved.

Not involved

http://www.iter.
org
The GBEP Secretariat is managed by the FAO. A
combination of country and NGO partners are cooperating
to develop cost-effective biofuels and implement them,
particularly in developing countries.
http://www.globalbioeenergy.org
Multilateral initiative that aims to develop policy and
legal mechanisms that will assist in renewable energy
implementation and to facilitate financing for clean energy
projects. Also helps to share best practices and energy
smart community planning models. The organization is
comprised of 8 regional secretariats that include
government actors, NGOs, business and development
banks.
http://www.reeep.org
Global policy network that aims to develop leadership in
clean energy technologies. Focuses on policy development
at sub-national, national, regional and international levels
to encourage the rapid expansion of renewable energy
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technology use. Neither Canada nor Mexico appears to be
directly involved, but UNDP, UNEP and the IEA are all
members, as well as the GEF and the World Bank.
http://www.ren21.net

BILATERAL INITIATIVES

USAID
Global
Climate
Change

244

NOT INVOLVED IN
BILATERAL
AGREEMENT

In 2005, U.S. and Mexico
agreed to:
• Continued cooperation
on the Methane to
Markets Initiative
(M2M).
• Technical assistance for
the periodic updating of
greenhouse gas
inventories and
development of
economic/environmental
models to support
decision-making;
• Cooperation through the
Carbon Sequestration
Leadership Forum
(CSLF) and development
of projects in geologic
sequestration for
consideration by CSLF
(including the
nomination of the Campo
Carmito project for
certification by the
CSLF);
• Cooperation in
development of
integrated carbon cycle
research, building toward
coordination through the
North American Carbon
Program; and
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• A robust program of
clean production
initiatives, including
activities designed to
promote energy
efficiency and the use of
renewable energy.
Additionally, the U.S. and
Mexico agreed to consider
joint projects to:
• Engage in public
outreach describing U.S.Mexico cooperation in
the area of climate
change through a joint
brochure reflecting
quantifiable projects;
• Carry out additional joint
planning for the July,
2005 economicenvironmental modeling
workshop to be held in
Mexico City;
• Identify ways to move
forward in the North
American Carbon
Program;
• Discuss possible future
cooperation in the area
of biofuels;
• Extend existing joint
modeling programs and
consider economic
factors in methane
recovery; and
• Discuss additional
collaborative studies in
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the area of adaptation,
such as the recently
completed Hermosillo,
Sonora study.

Debt-forNature
Agreements

President’s
Initiative
Against
Illegal
Logging

PublicPrivate Forest
Partnerships

Clean Energy
Initiative

Millennium
Challenge
Corporation

246

Canada, the US and a number of European countries have
independently initiated debt-for-nature agreements whereby
they forgive debt owed to them by developing countries in
exchange for the latter undertaking environmental
initiatives. Mexico has participated in various debt-fornature swaps with other governments and international
organizations. The US was a global leader in initiating such
agreements.
The US partners with
Not involved
developing countries on Not involved
a bilateral basis to assist
them put a stop to illegal
logging. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/ceq/
iniative_against_illegal
_logging. Pdf
Similar to the above
Not involved
initiative, the US
Not involved
partners with
developing countries on
a bilateral basis to
encourage reforestation
and sustainable forest
management.
US program designed
Not involved
to fund clean energy
Not involved
initiatives in developing
countries. Coordinated
by USAID.
US program designed
Not involved
to link funding for
Not involved
developing nations to
increased responsibility
for climate change.
Indirectly associated
with USAID.

CRAIK-DIMENTO[1] (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 1: 195, 2009]

2/5/2016 12:39 PM

Climate Law and Policy in North America
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE AND ENERGY LAW

APPENDIX 2

Targets

Canada

U.S.

Mexico

Absolute 20%
reduction from
2006 levels by
2020 [this will
bring emissions
to approx. 600
Mt which is
still above 1990
levels].

Cut GHG
intensity by 18%
by 2012
[announced as
goal in 2002].

National target to be
set in 2008.

Turning the
Corner
(http://www.ec.
gc.ca/default.as
p?lang=En&n=
75038EBC-1).

Industry
Goals

U.S. Action to
Address Energy
Security, Clean
Development and
Climate Change
(http://www.state
.gov/g/oes/rls/or/
97380.htm).

Special program on cc.
Focus on establishing
performance
standards, reporting
emissions and doing
economic assessments.

Reduce
emissions by
165 Mt from
projected levels
by 2020.

Direct carbon
intensity
reduction of 53%
from 1990 levels
by 2010.

National Climate
Change Strategy
(http://www.semarnat.
gob.mx/queessemarnat
/politica_ambiental/ca
mbioclimatico/Pages/e
strategia.aspx).
Develop the combined
heat and power
potential of the
national cement, steel
and sugar industries.

50% decrease
in HFCs by
2020.

Reduce HFCs by
50% and improve
fuel efficiency by
30%.

Eliminate subsidies for
fossil fuel energy
consumption and
production.

Reduce PFCs by
10% below 1995
baseline by 2010.

Implement
compulsory and
voluntary
standardization of
equipment, vehicles,

Regs for GHG
emissions apply
to 16 sectors.
Credit program
for early action

Eliminate SF6
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(prior to 2006)
and offset
program for
projects post
Jan. 1, 2008.
Firms may
contribute to a
technology
fund as a means
of compliance
for the 20102017 period,
subject to
limits.
A further 5
Mt/year of
credits will be
available
through the
research and
development
component.
Technology
fund will take a
portfolio
approach to
investment in a
range of
deployment and
development
projects.
Fund will seek
ownership of
resulting
emission
reductions
based on
project cost
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emissions by
200.

Tax incentives
from 2005 to
2015 for
reduction of
GHG emissions.

power generation
systems and
consumption in
homes, offices and
industry.
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Oil and
Coal

Mandatory
emissions
reductions in
2010 and
getting tougher
every year
(especially for
coal-fired
plants and oil
sands); new
plants between
2004 and 2011
have tougher
emission
standards;
plants built post
2011 will end
construction of
dirty coal-fired
plants and
mandatory
CCS/other
green
technology in
oil sands.
Tougher
standards tied
to CCS.
Cut GHG
emissions from
coal processing
(for energy and
cement
industries) by
more than 50%.

Install highly
efficient CHP
plants.

Install CHP (combined
heat and power) plants
in PEMEX facilities.
Substitute individual
generation plants for a
15 MW combined
cycle plant connected
to offshore platforms.
Increase PEMEX’s
energy efficiency
target by 5%.
Reduce fugitive NH4
emissions from natural
gas production,
transportation and
distribution, increase
efficiency of flares on
offshore platforms.
Reduce the
dependence on oil.
Increase thermal
efficiency of fuel oilfired thermoelectric
plants by 2%.
Phase out and reorient
fuel oil production
incentives; install on
the Pacific coast a
gasification terminal
for imported liquefied
national gas and
convert fuel oil-fired
thermoelectric plants
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to combined cycle.

Electricity
Sector

Establishing a
clean electricity
task force to
work with
provinces and
industry to
meet goal of
cutting
emissions by 25
Mt by 2020.
Create 90% of
electricity from
sources that do
not emit GHGs.

Green Power
Partnership
provides
incentives to
companies to
purchases green
electricity.

Encourage the
regulated participation
of private enterprise in
low carbon energy
generation
(particularly in CHP
and renewables).

Efficiency
improvements in
hydroelectric
dams [from
WIREC].

Increase efficiency of
transmission and
distribution lines by
2%.
Facilitate connection
of independent
suppliers to the
national grid.

40% of all new
electricity
capacity should
be from
renewables.
Increase
electricity from
wind and water
by 20x.

Energy
Efficiency

$1.48 billion
invested for
cleaner
electricity
New EE
requirements
for commercial/
consumer
products.
Ban inefficient
incandescent

250

Maintain the
Energy Star
program
including the
EPA recent
revisions to
standards.

Continue application
of current energy
efficiency standards
and develop new ones.
Strengthen current
Trust Fund for Energy
Savings (FIDE)
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light bulbs.

Renewable
energy

Improve EE by
20% including
buildings.
Inclusion of
renewable tax
incentives in
2008 budget
[WIREC].

More energy
efficient schools.

programs and promote
new ones.

Promote
renewable energy
and biofuels to
reduce gasoline
use by 20% in
ten years
(cellulosic
ethanol is big
one).

Promote renewable
energy sources,
including sustainably
produced biofuels, and
low carbon
technology.
Amend the proposed
Law on the Use of
Renewable Energy
Sources to increase
renewables in overall
power generation
above the present
target of 8%.
Install 7000 MW of
renewable energy
capacity to generate
16,000 GWh per year
(additional to the two
current plants).
Introduce 500,000
high efficiency wood
burning stoves in rural
communities.

Transportation

Mandatory
renewable fuel
content in
gasoline, diesel
and heating oil

Increase supply
of renewable and
alternative fuels
by setting
mandatory fuel

Replace freight trucks
and diesel busses more
than 10 years old from
2008 onwards.
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(ethanol up to
5%).

Fuel
consumption
standards for
cars, light
trucks and sport
utility vehicles.
Increase fuel
efficiency in
new cars by
more than 20%.
New fleet
management
techniques,
harmonizing
trucking
practices and
cost-sharing for
improved
technologies.
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standard to
require 35 billion
gallons of
renewable/
alternative fuels
in ten years.
Reform and
modernize
Corporate
Average Fuel
Economy
standards for cars
and extend the
current light
truck rule.
Slowing
projected growth
of carbon dioxide
emissions from
cars, light trucks
and SUVs.

Increase the
performance of the
motorized transport
fleet by promoting the
acquisition of vehicles
with low GHG
emissions.
Implement policies to
promote low carbon
emissions in public
transport and
increased use of rail
for freight.
Increase rail coverage
for freight
transportation
by 10%.

SmartWay
Transport
Partnership;
improving
energy security
and reducing fuel
consumption as
well as idling.
30% efficiency
improvement in
airline engines.

Agriculture

252

Encourage
emission
reductions.

Reduce use of
nitrogen
fertilizers.

Develop standards for
fertilizer use according
to region and crop.

Remove
environmentally

Promote the
reconversaion of
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sensitive
cropland from
production and
install vegetative
cover to
sequester carbon.
Sell carbon
credits generated
from lands
enrolled in CRP
program.
Grants for
agricultural
producers and
rural small
businesses to
purchase
renewable energy
systems.

Forestry

Encourage
emission
reductions and
use as credits.

Promote methane
reductions.
Discouraging
illegal logging
(President’s
Action).

agricultural land to
perennial and mixed
crops in 900,000
hectares.
Promote alternatives
to slash and burn
agriculture in 100,000
hectares to reduce
related forest fires.
Employ conservation
tillage and foster cover
crops in 200,000
hectares.
Rehabilitate 450,000
hectares of grazing
and rangelands.

Increase the area under
sustainable forest
management by 2.6
million hectares per
year.
Expand coverage of
current programs of
payment for
environmental services
to accumulatively
reach 2.49 million
hectares by 2012.
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Increase coverage of
Protected Areas by
500,000 hectares par
year to accumulate 3
million hectares in the
National Protected
Areas System.
Integrate
approximately 6
million hectares of
tropical, temperate and
arid zone ecosystems
within Wildlife
Management Areas.
Carry out
phytosanitary
diagnosis and
treatment in
approximately
640,000 hectares of
forest per year.
Reforest 285,000
hectares a year to
accumulate 1.71
million hectares by
2012.
Restore and reforest
degraded soils in an
area of 115000
hectares annually to
accumulate 690000
hectares.
Expand the area in
commercial
plantations at a rate of
10000- hectares per
year to accumulate
another 600000
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hectares.
Identify opportunities
for carbon capture
projects in forest
ecosystems under the
CDM.

Emissions
Trading
Scheme

Not mentioned
in federal
policy
documents.

Not mentioned in
federal policy
documents.

Establishment of an
integrated national
scheme for emissions
trading through
medium term.
Increasing number of
participating sectors
and the value of the
carbon traded in
phases.
Operate with
controlled carbon
prices which would be
subject to periodic
review until reaching
equilibrium with
international market
prices.
Coupling the national
scheme with
international schemes
and commitments.
Bring PEMEX
(national oil company)
into the scheme.
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Not mentioned
in federal
policy
documents.

Not mentioned in
federal policy
documents.

$4 billion for
research of
renewable
energies.

Committed $50
billion to
research and $86
billion to R&D
tax incentives.

Technology
fund seems
focused on
clean energy
technology
and CCS
techniques.

Research to focus
on clean energy
technology
including
renewable
sources.
Additional
research foci
include; carbon
sequestration,
coal-fired, nearzero emissions
power
generation,
hydrogen,
nuclear fission
and fusion.

Support for
Subnational
Agreements

$1.5 billion in
funding for
provincial/territ
orial initiatives.
Provincial
success could
be beyond the
20% absolute
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Partner with
states to adopt a
variety of clean
energy policies
and programs.

Policy includes
adaptation priorities;
focus on public
information and
institutional capacity
to monitor and manage
risk due to climate
change.
Building research
programs focused on
energy generation/use;
forest resources
conservation and
management; crop
production; livestock
production;
hydrometeorological
risk and water
resource management;
biodiversity;
agriculture; coasts;
human settlements;
energy generation and
use; human health.
Also focus on low
carbon energy sources
and renewables.

Not mentioned in
federal policy
document.
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reduction called
for by federal
government
(but not
budgeting
for that
specifically)
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